

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CIG-A 23,09



November 10, 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Central Intelligence Agency,
Chief, Projects Division, Intelligence Staff, ORE

SUBJECT: The Current Situation in Spain, ORE-53

The Intelligence organization of the Department of State, as a result of consultation between members of OIR and ORE, concur in all parts of the amended draft of subject paper except paragraph 5, to which the Department offers dissent.

It is the Department's recommendation that paragraph 5 be amended to read substantially as follows:

5. Probable Developments.

Political change is not to be expected in Spain in the immediate future. A successful revolt by any group now opposed to Franco is out of the question. Bad as economic conditions are, they do not foreshadow an economic collapse in Spain or an administrative collapse of the Franco regime so long as conditions in the rest of Europe do not improve markedly faster than in an isolated Spain. Any succession movement that could take over power while avoiding the renewal of civil war that the Spaniards dread would have to be broadly based, possess the support of the Army, and enjoy some prior understanding with major Western powers. Despite recent progress in preliminary negotiations between the Don Juan monarchists and moderate leftists led by Prieto, these conditions are not now fulfilled and seem unlikely to be so for many months to come. The Spanish Communists -- too weak to revolt, unable to count on economic chaos, and excluded from the only promising succession movement -- offer no immediate threat to the stability of the Franco regime.

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Barring his own death or upheaval in the rest of Europe, Franco's regime is capable of continuing essentially unchanged for years. The longer his repression of political action is maintained, the deeper the political discouragement and apathy of most Spaniards is likely to become, but, also the greater resentment and desperate impatience will the thwarted politically-minded minorities develop. The Communists will be exploiting both this apathy and this impatience. The longer, therefore, that the crisis over the succession to Franco is delayed, the more necessary for the avoidance of chaos or an armed contest between political extremists becomes the emergence of a moderate "shadow" government prepared to fill a power vacuum without delay.

For the Acting Special Assistant:



Merritt B. Booth

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